Competition in Transmission Planning and Development:
Current Status and International Experience

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Agenda

Background: Drivers and Non-incumbent Business Models

Scope of Competitive Processes in Various Regions

Existing Experience

Implications and Lessons Learned
Background

Focus of this presentation: Competition in the development and construction of transmission projects with regulated cost recovery

- As opposed to merchant transmission projects without regulated cost recovery

Why competition: to find the best solutions to address significant new transmission investment needs at lower cost or higher value

- U.S. transmission investments by FERC-jurisdictional transmission providers increased from $2 billion/year in the 1990s to $10-13 billion/year in last several years
- We project $120-160 billion of investments over the next decade (for reliability, to integrate new resources, upgrade/replace aging existing facilities built in 1950-70s)

Challenge: How to put incumbents and potential competitors on a level playing field without losing value while managing risks?

- Reduce barriers faced by non-incumbent transmission developers without ignoring the real advantages of incumbent transmission providers (local expertise, right-of-way, etc.)
- Reduce barriers to finding innovative solutions to transmission need that provide higher value and/or lower cost
Competition Mostly for “Regulated” Transmission

Transmission is largely infrastructure investments based on state or regional planning with cost recovery at regulated rates

- Transmission is a public good:
  - Benefits broad in scope, wide-spread geographically, diverse in impacts on market participants, and occurring over many decades
  - Owners generally unable to capture sufficient portion of benefits
  - Will tend to lead to under-investment and over-use

Competition discussed in industry today is mostly for the development of regulated transmission projects

- Out-of-footprint investments by established transmission owners
- Independent transmission developers
- Elimination of “Right of First Refusal” (ROFR) of incumbent transmission owners for new builds approved in regional transmission plans as required by Order 1000

Few unregulated (“merchant”) transmission projects

- Mostly HVDC lines in or between regions with sustained price differentials or resource needs
Emerging Non-Incumbent Business Models

While focusing primarily on regulated investments, non-incumbent transmission developers have become increasingly active. We identified 10 distinct business models:

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<th>Examples</th>
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</table>
Background: Drivers and Non-incumbent Business Models

Scope of Competitive Processes in Various Regions

- Types of transmission projects eligible
- Timing of competition in overall planning process
- U.S. RTOs: Proposed Competitive Processes
- Selection Criteria

Existing Experience

Implications and Lessons Learned
Jurisdictions with Competitive Processes

Brazil
- Since 1999 all transmission projects have been auctioned

U.K.
- Tenders for offshore grid projects

U.S. Regional Planning Efforts
- ERCOTs’ competitive renewable energy zones (CREZ)
- FERC-jurisdictional regions at different stages of implementing various forms of competitive processes, largely as a result of FERC Order 1000

Ontario
- One competitive solicitation for transmission to date

Alberta
- Developed a competitive process; currently running the first RFP
Types of Projects Eligible

“Competitive” projects are distinguished by one or more of the following:

- Local vs. regional cost allocation; new facilities vs. upgrades of existing
  - Used by every U.S. planning region (FERC Order No. 1000)
  - Details (including regional vs. inter-regional) still sorted out by FERC

- Higher Voltage Classes
  - CAISO (>200 kV), SPP (>300 kV), Brazil (≥230kV)

- Timing of need
  - Competitive process deemed too time consuming to address near-term system needs
  - PJM: competitive windows depend on need in 3-5 yrs
  - ISO-NE, SPP: exempt reliability and local projects needed within 3 years

- Special planning efforts:
  - CREZ; Offshore Wind in U.K.

- State ROFRs may preclude competition

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<th>General focus of competition</th>
<th>Higher voltage and/or “regional” projects</th>
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<td>Reliability-driven</td>
<td>Some Direct Assignments</td>
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<td>Public Policy or Special Projects</td>
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Can./U.S. RTOs, Brazil

U.K., ERCOT
**Scope of Competition in Planning Process**

Developers compete to provide and build innovative solutions to specified need

- RTO identifies need and solicits competitive proposals/solutions
- RTO selects preferred solution; winner has rights to finance, own, and construct their solution
- **Examples: PJM, ISO-NE, NYISO**

Developers only compete to finance, build, own, and operate

- RTO/System Planner identifies need and develops/identifies solution
- Competition to finance, own, and construct based on a number of factors including costs
- **Examples: Brazil, Alberta, Ontario, CAISO, ERCOT, MISO, SPP**
U.S. RTOs: Proposed Competitive Processes

PJM: Based on need date
- Projects needed in 4 years and beyond are competitive
- Projects needed in 3 years or less are likely designated to incumbent
- FERC ruled that complete rebuilds or new facilities on existing right of way can be competitive
- Artificial Island project first example

SPP: Based on voltage class
- >300kV (Highway) projects are competitive
- 100-300kV (Byway) projects are competitive (unless needed within 3 years)
- July 18th FERC order: accepted >300kV projects as competitive; rejected retention of ROFR for Byway projects (unless needed within 3 years)

MISO: Based on needs driver
- Market Efficiency and Multi-Value Projects (MEP and MVP) are competitive
- Baseline Reliability Projects and other classifications retain ROFR
- MISO proposed many exclusions for projects to retain ROFR, but FERC ordered that MISO must eliminate many of these exclusions to allow for competition
CAISO: Based on voltage class and regional designation
- All regional projects (all >200 kV, some <200kV) are competitive
- Incumbents build local projects and upgrades to existing facilities
- FERC mostly accepted CAISO’s competitive designations, but asked for clarification on tariff language and revisions to the developer selection process

NYISO: Based on needs driver and need date
- Reliability and economic projects are competitive
- Regulated backstop solutions for reliability are developed if timeline hits “trigger date” on lead time needed to address reliability need
- NYISO did not propose to have a central role in selecting projects to meet public policy needs; FERC required the ISO to submit tariff revisions

ISO-NE: Based on need date
- Above 115kV, reliability (for need > 3 years), economic, and public policy projects are competitive
- Incumbent retains ROFR if reliability project is needed within 3 years or if incumbent is only entity to submit proposal to address an identified need
- Latest filing in November 2013; FERC response TBD
## Evaluation Criteria for Competitive Bids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>PJM</th>
<th>NYISO</th>
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<th>ERCOT/CREZ</th>
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- Some aspects of U.S. proposed competitive processes are still subject to revisions and FERC approval
- U.S. RTOs also require non-incumbent participation in regional planning process
- Selection process for innovative solution solicitations may vary depending on each project

✓ - Key Qualification Criteria
✓✓ - Selection Criteria
Background: Drivers and Non-incumbent Business Models

Scope of Competitive Processes in Various Regions

Existing Experience

- Brazil
- United Kingdom
- Ontario and Alberta
- CAISO, PJM, and ERCOT

Implications and Lessons Learned
Brazil: 15 years of Competitive Transmission

Competitive auctions for transmission since 1999

- Ministry of Mines and Energy determines transmission expansion based on Planning Company (EPE) and System Operator (ONS) studies that include evaluating N-1 security criteria
- The national Electricity Regulator (ANEEL) implements plan and conducts auctions for new projects
- Facilities (≥ 230kV) required to meet system needs are auctioned off to select who builds-operates and owns
- Auction process starts with a maximum reference annual revenue allowed (max. RAP), bidders propose lower RAP with the winner being the lowest
  - Concession is granted for 30 years, after 15 years the RAP payment is reduced by 50%
  - Payment profile is front loaded to facilitate debt payment and faster recovery of asset
  - Annual revenues are revised periodically, reviewed every 5 years
  - Difference between the max. RAP and the winning RAP illustrate the benefits
- Incentives to deliver ahead-of-time and maintain high availability (increase in revenues)
- Agents with a record of delays in project execution are prohibited from participating
Brazil: 15 years of Competitive Transmission (cont’d)

- Over 50,000 km of new transmission built (over 230 kV) with a total investment of $28 billion
  - Proposed revenue requirement would be $4.45 billion per year
  - Actual revenue requirement is $3.35 billion per year -> $1.1 billion lower than RAP (25%)
  - 30 lots were auctioned in 2013 (first three auctions), nine lots were not bid on
    - WSJ reported that government required utilities to write down the value of investments and slash revenues in exchange for contract renewals – resulting in a reduction in investment
    - In previous auctions, when no lots have been bid upon, the lot returns in a later auction

Brazil Transmission Auction Results

Source: ANEEL Transmission Auction Results
ERCOT: Competitive Renewable Energy Zones

In 2008 ERCOT identified transmission needed to integrate an additional 11,000 MW of wind (for 18,000 MW total) in pre-specified Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ)

- First identified high-potential wind zones; then alternative transmission plans to integrate resource in zones
- PUCT selected preferred transmission option
  - Selection based on capabilities to finance, license, construct, operate and maintain facilities in beneficial and cost-effective manner, projected capital and O&M costs, schedule, among others
  - Competitive bidding process, 14 companies awarded projects, including non-incumbents
  - Originally estimated at $4.97B for 2,963 miles of new 345kV transmission lines
  - As of October 2013, estimated cost was $6.81 B for 3,588 miles of new lines

Source: Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) – CREZ Progress Report (October 2013)
UK: Competitive Offshore Grid

Competitive tender process to connect up to 48 GW of offshore wind by 2020

- To keep transmission unbundled from generation, offshore transmission licenses granted through a competitive tender process
  - First two tenders were for simple radial connections to the shore,
  - Third tender for larger, more complex transmission to wind plants further from shore
- Offshore Transmission Network Owners (OFTO) receive 20 year availability-based revenue stream
- “Transitional regime”: wind developers construct the transmission assets, which are then transferred to OFTO through Ofgem’s tender process
  - Role of the OFTO is to finance, own and operate the transmission asset
  - OFTO reimbursed wind developer for transmission project costs
- “Enduring regime”: wind developers can choose who builds the transmission
  - **Option 1**: Generator develops and builds – same as transitional regime
  - **Option 2**: OFTO’s also develops and builds the transmission project, possibly reducing the capital cost of the project
  - Question as to the likelihood of the OFTO-build option since wind plant developers would no longer be in-charge of transmission delivery schedule
UK: Competitive Offshore Grid (cont’d)

First round of competition commenced in 2009

- Ten licenses transferring £1.6 billion have been granted to date in two tenders
  - Three licenses worth (£940 million) are still to be confirmed in second tender
  - All projects are built by generation developer, with assets transferred to OFTO
  - Competition to bring cost savings – Ofgem estimates £350 million of savings from the nine licenses granted in first tender

- Third tender (2 licenses, estimated at ~ £400 million) under the “enduring regime” expected to start in 2014
  - Simpler and quicker combined pre-qualification and qualification to tender process
  - Using the generation developer build option

Audit of initial transactions completed in 2012

- National Audit Office reviewed four license awards worth £254 million by Jan. 2012
- Competitive process has delivered some benefits, and has potential to deliver more
- Transaction costs were 7.5-21% of the value of the assets transferred, though it is expected that this will decline (costs are recovered)
- Further work is required to establish robust benchmarks for transmission construction costs
Ontario: 400km, 230 kV Thunder-Bay-to-Wawa

Ontario Energy Board solicited proposals to:
- Encourage new entrants to transmission in Ontario
- Support competition to drive economic efficiency for the benefit of rate payers

Six bids received with costs significantly below original incumbent proposal

Selection based scores in the following categories:
- Organization & Project Management
- Technical Capability
- Proposed Design
- Cost: Development, Construction, O&M
  - Ranked on project development costs + clarity and completeness of construction and O&M estimates (but not total costs)
- Financial Capacity
- Schedule: Development & Construction
- Community Consultation
- First Nations & Metis Consultation
- First Nations & Metis Participation

Awarded to UCT (NextEra, Enbridge, Borealis)
- Ranked highest in 6 of the 9 categories, total score of 455 (out of possible 540)
- Runners up (AltaLink, HydroOne (incumbent) partnership) both scored 385
  - Other participants: REC Canada & MEHC Transmission (scored – 280), Fortis (200), Iccon (Netherlands) & TransCanada (185)
Ontario: 400km, 230 kV Thunder Bay to Wawa (cont’d)

- Selection process was scored on equal category weighting
- Competition on costs was only 1 of 9 categories
  - OEB judged costs based on ranking of project development costs and completeness of cost estimate (not necessarily lowest cost)

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<th>Cost Category Judging and Project Development &amp; Construction Costs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Project</td>
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<td>AltaLink</td>
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<td>UCT: NextEra, Enbridge, Borealis</td>
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<td>RES: Renewable Energy Systems Canada, MEHC</td>
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<td>EWT: Hydro One (Incumbent), Great Lakes Power Transmission</td>
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<td>CNPI: Fortis</td>
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<td>Iccon (Netherlands), TransCanada</td>
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Source: Ontario Energy Board (2013). *East-West Tie Line Designation Phase 2 Decision and Order*
Alberta: 500km, 500 kV Fort McMurray-to-Edmonton

Single circuit line and two substations between Edmonton and Fort McMurray

- Identified in 2009 LTP as “critical transmission infrastructure” with ISD of 2019
- AESO directed in 2010 to develop a “fair and open” competitive process to determine who is eligible to apply for the construction and operation of CTI
- Single owner model – successful proponent is responsible for all project activities including ownership, operation, and maintenance of the facilities for 35 years
- Process was approved by the Alberta Utilities Commission in Feb. 2013
- Request for Expression of Interest (May – June, 2013)
- Request for Qualifications (October, 2013)
  - Over 30 organizations expressed interest in this phase of the project
  - AESO-selected panel of experts could shortlist up to five bidders for the RFP stage
- Request for Proposal (2014)
  - Five companies were invited to bid, all include local participation
  - Technical and financial submissions evaluated in Q4 – 2014
  - Selection by year-end

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Local Participant</th>
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<td>Athabasca Transmission</td>
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<td>NorSpan Partners LP</td>
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<td>TAMA Transmission LP</td>
<td>TransAlta</td>
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<tr>
<td>TransCanada/Elecnor</td>
<td>TransCanada Pipelines</td>
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Source: AESO Media Release
CAISO: 59 miles, 230kV Gates-Gregg

Identified in 2012-2013 Transmission Plan
- Reliability project with policy and econ benefits
- 59 mile, 230 kV line between PG&E owned substations, latest ISD: 2022

Key Selection Factors
- Experience acquiring rights-of-way
- Current & expected capabilities to finance, license, construct, operate and maintain
- Schedule; cost containment

5 qualified applicants
- Incumbent can share ROW with existing line and reduce easement requirements
- Non-incumbents did not have existing ROW and thus would face additional costs, approvals, difficulties with eminent domain, etc...

Incumbent JV (PG&E/Mid-American) selected

PJM: Artificial Island

Competition to address reliability need

- Improve stability, operational performance, and eliminate potential planning criteria violations at Artificial Island (includes Salem & Hope Creek nuclear plants)

PJM Evaluation in progress

- Technical Evaluations
  - Evaluation of enhancements to lower cost projects
- Constructability and costs
- Project sponsor evaluation
- Reviews do not include a cost/benefit test
- TEAC recommendation in Feb-Mar 2014

Solicitation resulted in innovative solutions

- 7 proponents with 26 proposals,
  - Cost estimates ranged from $116 million to $1.5 billion
  - Solutions varied in technology including: SVC, 230 kV, 500 kV, HVDC
- Many studies needed to determine which would be most effective

Source: PJM TEAC Jan. 2014 Reliability Analysis Update
PJM: Market Efficiency Projects (MEPs)

Considered competitive in that any participant can propose solutions for projected congestion points, solicitation through PJM process

- 17 project proposals from 6 proponents
- Most projects did not pass benefit/cost (B/C) test
  - 5 projects were no longer needed
  - 9 projects scored less than 1.25 on B/C test

Three projects passed the B/C test

- All relieved congestion at Hunterstown Transformer and thus solutions compared by PJM for recommendation
  - First Energy: $8 million to install a 2nd transformer and reconductor existing 115kV line
  - LS Power: install new 230kV line
  - LS Power install new substations and new 138kV line
- Comparison of proposals to select project
- Review of B/C test, reliability impacts, sensitivity (delay ISD, gas price, load increases)
- Evaluation of portfolio of combined projects
- Recommendation: lowest-cost project from First Energy
Background: Drivers and Non-incumbent Business Models

Scope of Competitive Processes in Various Regions

Existing Experience

Implications and Lessons Learned
Implications and Lessons Learned

Experience with established competitive transmission processes (Brazil, UK) suggests competition can offer lower-cost solutions

- But portion of cost savings is offset by higher transactions cost of process

Emerging Canadian and US experience shows importance of local expertise and incumbent participation

- Having local experience/partner will often be critical
- Incumbents retain significant advantages:
  - Local system knowledge and relationship with RTO planning groups
  - Lower-cost opportunities to upgrade existing facilities
  - Sharing of existing ROW

Competitive project selection processes vary substantially and are still evolving; may not yet identify lowest-cost or highest-value solutions

- Ranking/scoring methods often do not adequately account for cost/value advantages
- Evaluation of innovative solution proposed by competitors difficult due to wide range of solutions presented
- Narrow scope of RTO evaluation processes for “economic” projects will continue to be a barrier for valuable projects that offer a wide range of benefits
Additional Reading


“Comments of Peter Fox-Penner, Johannes Pfeifenberger, and Delphine Hou,” in response to FERC’s Notice of Request for Comments on Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation (Docket AD09-8).
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Johannes (Hannes) Pfeifenberger is an economist with a background in power engineering and over 20 years of experience in the areas of public utility economics and finance. He has published widely, assisted clients and stakeholder groups in the formulation of business and regulatory strategy, and submitted expert testimony to the U.S. Congress, courts, state and federal regulatory agencies, and in arbitration proceedings. Hannes has extensive experience in the economic analyses of wholesale power markets and transmission systems. His recent experience includes reviews of RTO capacity market and resource adequacy designs, testimony in contract disputes, and the analysis of transmission benefits, cost allocation, and rate design. He has performed market assessments, market design reviews, asset valuations, and cost-benefit studies for investor-owned utilities, independent system operators, transmission companies, regulatory agencies, public power companies, and generators across North America.

Hannes received an M.A. in Economics and Finance from Brandeis University and an M.S. in Power Engineering and Energy Economics from the University of Technology in Vienna, Austria.

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