Emerging Business Models for Non-Incumbent Transmission Projects

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Presented by
Johannes Pfeifenberger

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Agenda

U.S. Transmission Investment Needs
- Growing nation-wide investments
- Size of market for incumbent and non-incumbent transmission

Opportunities and Challenges for Non-Incumbent Transmission
- Types of non-incumbent opportunities
- Experience with and scope for competitively assigned transmission
- Policy challenges

Non-incumbent Business Models
- Models for development and construction of transmission projects outside of incumbent transmission owners footprint
- Transmission cost recovery as main driver of business model
Growing Transmission Investments

1995–2017 Annual Transmission Investment by
FERC-jurisdictional Transmission Owners

Sources and Notes: The Brattle Group's analysis of FERC Form 1 data compiled in Ventyx's Velocity Suite. Based on EIA data available through 2003, FERC-jurisdictional transmission owners estimated to account for 80% of transmission assets in the Eastern Interconnection, and 60% in WECC and ERCOT. Facilities >300kV estimated to account for 60-80% of shown investments. EEI annual transmission expenditures updated May 2014 shown (2008-2017) based on prior year's actual investment through 2012 and planned investment thereafter.
Projected Transmission Investment Opportunities

Renewable Generation Additions
Aging Facilities
Interregional Buildout
Coal Plant Retirement and Clean Power Plan
Reliability Upgrades, Gen Interconnection, Load Serving
Pockets of High Load Growth (e.g., Oil & Gas Development)

Projected U.S. Investments through 2030:
$120-160 billion/decade

Ultimately Open to Non-Incumbents?

Sources and Notes:
The $120-160 billion projection per decade was originally developed in conjunction with WIRES for “Employment and Economic Benefits of Transmission Investment in the US and Canada,” May 2011. This projection has since been refined and regionalized in several client-confidential analyses.
Competition Mostly for “Regulated” Transmission

Transmission investment remain largely regulated, based on state or regional planning with cost recovery at regulated rates

- Transmission is a public good:
  - Benefits broad in scope, wide-spread geographically, diverse in impacts on market participants, and occurring over many decades
  - Owners generally unable to capture sufficient portion of benefits
  - Will tend to lead to under-investment and over-use without regulated cost recovery

Competition discussed in industry today is mostly for the construction of regulated transmission projects

- Out-of-footprint investments by established transmission owners and independent developers
- Elimination of “Right of First Refusal” (ROFR) of incumbent transmission owners for new builds approved in regional transmission plans as required by Order 1000

Some unregulated “merchant” transmission projects

- Mostly HVDC lines between regions with sustained price differentials, resource needs, and ineffective interregional planning of regulated transmission
Jurisdictions with Competitive Processes

U.S. regulated transmission opportunities for non-incumbents

- FERC-jurisdictional regions
  - U.S. RTOs at different stages of implementing various frameworks for competitive processes, largely as a result of FERC Order 1000
- ERCOTs’ competitive renewable energy zones (CREZ)

Important international experience

- **Alberta**: Developed a competitive process for major new projects; assigned first $1.4 billion project (significantly below AESO estimates)
- **Ontario**: One competitive solicitation for transmission to date
- **Brazil**: Since 1999 all transmission projects have been auctioned off (similar processes in other Latin American countries, such as Chile)
- **UK**: Tenders for offshore grid projects
Developers compete to provide and build innovative solutions to meet needs
- Planning entities identify needs and solicit competitive proposals/solutions
- Planning entities select preferred solution; winner has rights to finance, build, own, and operate projects
  - Examples: PJM, ISO-NE, NYISO

Developers only compete to finance, build, own, and operate specified projects
- Planning entities identify need and specify solutions
- Competition to finance, own, and construct based on a number of factors including costs
  - Examples: Alberta, Ontario, Brazil, UK, CAISO, ERCOT, MISO, SPP
Policy Challenge of Non-Incumbent Ownership

How to put incumbents and competing non-incumbents on a level playing field without losing value while managing risks?

- Competition from non-incumbent transmission developers offers important advantages
  - Find more innovative solutions to identified need that provide higher value or lower costs
  - Bring valuable experience and best practices to region
  - Build identified solutions at lower cost

- Incumbent transmission providers also offer real advantages
  - Local expertise and accountability
  - Local O&M infrastructure
  - Existing facilities and rights-of-way

- Joint ventures as a logical way to capture combined advantages
Emerging Non-Incumbent Business Models

Non-incumbent transmission developers have become increasingly active through a number of distinct business models:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Model</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Project-specific transmission partnerships with incumbents</td>
<td>AEP and ITC “Novation” JVs in SPP, JVs to bid transmission in Alberta, Ontario, and CAISO</td>
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<td>2. Public-private partnerships</td>
<td>MATL, Transbay Cable, Path15</td>
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<td>3. Independent transmission project developers</td>
<td>Cleanline, Anbaric/PowerBridge, TDI, TransElect, AWC, Anschutz, ...</td>
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<td>5. Transmission (initially) bundled with renewables/generation</td>
<td>NextEra, LS Power, RES Americas, First Wind</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Incumbent-owned transmission development subsidiaries and JVs</td>
<td>Transource, Duke-ATC; BHE and Ameren Transmission Cos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Independent and semi-independent transmission companies</td>
<td>ITC, ATC, Hunt</td>
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Cost Recovery Drives Corporate Structure

Separate corporate entities and business models are often set up (by both incumbents and non-incumbents) to own portfolios of assets with similar regulatory treatment, cost recovery, and financing

- **Regulated** cost recovery of projects assigned to incumbents
  - Local cost recovery / bundled regulated rates
  - Shared cost recovery / unbundled transmission rates

- **Regulated** cost recovery of **competitively-assigned** projects

- **Merchant** cost recovery

Optimal corporate structure may shift as projects move from development to operations stages
Johannes (Hannes) Pfeifenberger is an economist with a background in power engineering and over 20 years of experience in the areas of public utility economics and finance. He has published widely, assisted clients and stakeholder groups in the formulation of business and regulatory strategy, and submitted expert testimony to the U.S. Congress, courts, state and federal regulatory agencies, and in arbitration proceedings.

Hannes has extensive experience in the economic analyses of wholesale power markets and transmission systems. His recent experience includes reviews of RTO capacity market and resource adequacy designs, testimony in contract disputes, and the analysis of transmission benefits, cost allocation, and rate design. He has performed market assessments, market design reviews, asset valuations, and cost-benefit studies for investor-owned utilities, independent system operators, transmission companies, regulatory agencies, public power companies, and generators across North America.

Hannes received an M.A. in Economics and Finance from Brandeis University and an M.S. in Power Engineering and Energy Economics from the University of Technology in Vienna, Austria.

Note:
The views expressed in this presentation are strictly those of the presenter and do not necessarily state or reflect the views of The Brattle Group, Inc.
Additional Reading


Pfeifenberger, Chang, Hou "Bridging the Seams: Interregional planning under FERC Order 1000," Public Utilities Fortnightly, November 2012.


Pfeifenberger and Hou, Transmission's True Value: Adding up the Benefits of Infrastructure Investments, Public Utilities Fortnightly, February 2012.


Pfeifenberger, Testimony on behalf of Southern California Edison Company re: economic impacts of the proposed Devers-Palo Verde No. 2 transmission line, before the Arizona Power Plant and Transmission Line Siting Committee, Docket No. L-00000A-06-0295-00130, Case No. 130, September and October, 2006.
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The Brattle Group provides consulting and expert testimony in economics, finance, and regulation to corporations, law firms, and governmental agencies around the world.

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